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Abstract—An implementation of the Remote Tower concept
comes with the challenge of optimizing staff resources subject to
safety requirements. To distinguish safe from unsafe assignments,
the quantification of tower controller workload—which is not a
new problem—needs to be reconsidered in the setting of a remote
tower environment. We plan to identify the remote operation
specific complexity factors, which will be the basis of finding mea-
sures that have a high correlation to these factors that together
describe the workload. In this paper, we analyze simulation
data for these complexity factors. In the simulation different
controllers rated the workload while monitoring multiple airports
(either with simultaneously visible screens, or switching between
the displays). We focus on complexity factors that stem from the
interplay of Tower and Ground Control. The resulting list of the
most significant complexity factors gives a base for our future
quantification of remote tower controller workload.
Keywords—Keywords-Remote Tower Services; Workload;
Taskload; Complexity Indicators; Human Performance
I. INTRODUCTION
Remote Tower Services (RTSs) allow that various airports
are controlled by air traffic controllers (ATCOs) located in
a Remote Tower Centre (RTC). The concept was designed
to counter staff-demand imbalances, which often appear at
small airports (with about 30-120 movements a day), and
lower their operational and human-resource (HR) costs. This
new concept fundamentally changes how operators provide
Air Traffic Services, as it becomes possible to control several
airports from a single controller working position. In such
settings an ATCO works at a so-called “multiple position”
at the RTC, which means that he/she can handle two or more
airports from one Remote Tower Module (RTM).
When a larger number of airports should be controlled from
a RTC, ATC procedures need to ensure that none of the
ATCOs is confronted with traffic-inherent, non-manageable
situations, that is, with situations in which the ATCO cannot
guarantee safe operation by controlling the traffic s/he is in
charge of. The problem is of increased interest to the Remote
Tower management, as they attempt to create reasonable
rosters for Remote Tower ATCOs. The problem of optimizing
rosters for air traffic controllers in RTC was first considered
in [8]. In this work the number of Instrumental Flight Rules
(IFR) flights was used as a measure of staff workload. But
according to LFV (Luftfartsverket, Swedish Air Navigation
Service Provider) traffic patterns, IFR traffic accounts for only
40% of the workload at smaller airports, and other important
aspects, which contribute to staff workload, such as ground
traffic movements, bad weather conditions, seasonal variations,
Visual Flight Rules (VFR), and extra traffic movements should
be taken into account.
Quantification of controller workload becomes even more
critical in the context of “multiple” Remote Control. Here
the task is not only to assign controllers to a RTM providing
control to one or more aerodromes, such that various safety
and operational requirements are fulfilled, but, in particular,
it is important to ensure that no ATCO is assigned to control
aerodromes that together constitute a non-manageable work-
load. To prevent such situations, RTC management may, e.g.,
employ two ATCOs during a potential risky period for one
RTM controlling two airports that otherwise is assigned to a
single ATCO. But how do they decide in which situations extra
staff is needed? In general, we can say that we want to split a
position if the workload becomes too high for a single ATCO
to handle. An objective assessment of workload and airspace
capacity (complexity) is crucial in order to find an appropriate
level of human responsibility. This is important as the current
method of evaluating workload and complexity in air traffic
can be seen as imprecise, subjective, or both.
While a lot of experiments and quantitative evaluations
exist for en-route traffic, this is not well researched for
aerodrome control, and even less so for a remote tower control.
Remote Towers further highlight a gap in assessing controller
workload: various factors influence the mental workload of
an ATCO, and there has been relatively little research into
all these factors. Thus, a better understanding of workload
in general—but even more so of the situation with remotely
controlled airports—is vitally important. Hence, before we
can make any quantitative statements (and define—hard or
soft—thresholds), we aim to identify factors that potentially
drive the complexity of the traffic situation the RTC ATCO
has to handle. The responsibilities of an RTC ATCO will
include not only runway control, but also ground control,
ground support and sometimes even apron control. We are, in
particular, interested to identify complex situations that derive
from the interaction of different controller tasks. Exactly these
situations will be what distinguishes a workload description
of a traditional tower controller from that of a remote tower
controller.
With this paper we do not aim to give an exhaustive list of
possible complexity factors for RTCs, but we present a first
subset of these factors. We focus on complexity factors that
stem from the interplay of Tower and Ground Control. For
that we analyze the data from [19], which DLR kindly made
available to us, described in detail in Section II.
A. Related Work
For en-route traffic, various assessment forms of workload
have been considered [2], [4], [6], [9], [13], [20]. Two often
used methods can be distinguished by the study goal: studies
with a HR-based perspective often use different scales (for
example adapted Cooper-Harper scale, e.g. [13], [16], [19])
ranging from „no problems“ to „traffic situation is not con-
trollable“. Then controllers are asked to rate the last handled
traffic situation frequently during a simulation run.
Another approach tries to identify certain factors that drive
the complexity of an airspace and aim to find an observable
measure (e.g., eye-movements, clicks on the radar screen etc.)
that has a high correlation with the aggregated complexity
factors. Many ATC complexity indicators have been proposed
in the literature [7], [9], [14], [22].
Several models were proposed aiming at relating ATC com-
plexity to workload. For example, taskload models [5], [21]
compute the cumulative time required to execute control tasks.
Linear regression models such as the popular dynamic density
models [10], [16], [22] approximate subjective workload rat-
ings by a linear combination of a number of ATC complexity
measures. Other works use a neural network instead of a linear
model [1], [6] to approximate subjective ratings.
There are two significant studies, which attempted to assess
complexity in the tower environment. Netjasov et al. [18]
developed a generic metric for measuring the complexity
of the terminal airspace (TMA). The work classified and
quantified the complexity factors within the TMA, dividing
them into static and dynamic components. In [12] the authors
investigated factors that contribute to complexity and their
incidence within Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic
Control Towers (ATCTs). Sixty-two Air Traffic Control Spe-
cialists (ATCSs) from six ATCTs rated 29 complexity factors
from local and ground controller perspective. The relative
contribution of each of the complexity factors was analyzed
and extended with the corresponding strategies which tower
controllers use to mitigate complexity in [11] .
While these works create a good base for understanding
situations with high controllers’ workload, they do not cover
the correlation between the discovered complexity indicators
and the resulting workload explicitly.
In [15], [16], [17] various aspects of work organization
and human performance issues related to the remote operation
are considered. The authors tested several methods to control
two airports from a single RTM. The aim of the studies was
not to propose a specific operational concept but to vary
influencing factors in order to understand their impact on
controller workload, situational awareness and performance.
Using human-in-the-loop simulations they analyzed how the
system design may influence behavioral strategies and thus
controller performance, and suggested several ideas on the
design of novel RTM workplaces. These works provide a basis
for our current paper.
ATCOs permanently survey air traffic, anticipate and detect
(potential) conflicts, intervene to resolve them, communicate
with pilots and ATCOs of neighboring sectors for handover,
and perform various other tasks that contribute to the task com-
plexity and drive an ATCO’s mental workload. Both workload
and taskload reflect the demand of the air traffic controller’s
control task: the taskload measures the objective demands,
while the workload reflects the subjective demand experienced
during that task. Of course, any quantitative, general model,
will access taskload rather than workload, however, the factors
that we extract influence both, taskload and workload, and we
will use workload throughout the rest of this paper.
B. Roadmap
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we detail how the data was collected and what was recorded.
We present the data analysis in Section III and conclude the
paper in Section IV.
II. DATA
The simulation setup by DLR (see [17], [19]), used working
positions that could be used to either have one ATCO working
at two airports, or a team of two controllers working at the two
airports together. Six teams of ATCO pairs were used for the
simulation runs. After an introduction, each ATCO participated
in two training runs, and the final simulation. The two airports
simulated were Erfurt and Braunschweig.
The study was designed to compare three different ap-
proaches to work distribution:
(a) One controller responsible for a single airport
(b) Two controllers responsible for both airports (controller
and coordinator)
(c) One controller responsible for both airports
All simulation scenarios had “high” traffic volume to
achieve parallel movements at Erfurt and Braunschweig. In
some simulation runs both airports were visible simultane-
ously, in other runs, a switching of the screen was necessary
to see the other airport. In this paper, we will focus on (c).
A. Data Collection
An adapted Cooper-Harper Scale (see the appendix of the
thesis by Peters [19] for the complete scale) builds the base
for the data collection—it is an adaptation of an already
altered Cooper-Harper Scale that combines handling-qualities
and workload to the ATC environment. The scale uses a rating
from 1-10 to differentiate the impact of traffic situations on
perceived handling qualities, shown in Table I. This scale
was also used to assess the influence of workplace design on
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE ADAPTED COOPER-HARPER SCALE BY DLR
Rating Evaluation Question for Evaluation
1 No problems, desirable Is the situation solvable
2 Simple, desirable without major
3 Adequate, desirable Disturbance?
4 Small, but disruptive “delays”
5 Medium loss of capacity, Is the situation solvable by
which can be improved capacity-reducing
6 Very disruptive, measures?
but tolerable difficulties
7 Problems to predict
development of traffic situation Is the situation solvable
8 Problems in if the ATCO works
information processing with a reduced
9 Problems in situational
9 information reception awareness?
10 Impossible
ATCOs workload. A rating of seven or higher was handled
as being critical in terms of safety. Whilst one ATCO was
controlling the traffic, the other observed the situation and
was asked to assess any multiple specific situation with the
adapted scale. There was a set of pre-defined situations, like
two simultaneous landings. Additionally, the observer ATCO
was asked to rate any situation which could only occur because
of the multiple working conditions.
B. Data Set
The data set consists of 222 ratings for 222 situations,
produced by 12 different ATCOs. On average, an ATCO rated
19 situations (sd = 8). Each rating consists of the following
information:
• Team number
• Experimental condition, training or not
• Workplace design; Switching necessary (UJ) or not (UN)
• Predefined situation number (one out of a list of nine, e.g.,
landing at one airport and taxiing traffic at the other)
• Evaluation according to the adapted Cooper-Harper Scale
• A brief description of the problem/situation
Data preparation for the analysis consisted of a coding of
the ratings based on the predefined situations and the problem
description. Coding variables were created and adapted during
the coding process to capture all ratings. Besides typical flight
phases and connected ATCO clearances (e.g. initial call, land-
ing, called events), conflicts, emergencies and performance
problems of the ATCO (e.g. mix-up of airports) were used for
coding. Finally, the coding scheme consisted of 23 variables.
These variables are the initial events.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FACTORS
We aim to identify the critical complexity factors that drive
the workload of a remote tower ATCO. To this end, we
want to identify the situations at the two controlled airports
in the simulation that induce a risk. We chose to analyze
the data by aggregating the information w.r.t. combination
of events. Combinations of events build a situation, that is,
we, for example, identified all controllers that evaluated a
scenario in which the two events taxi and landing appear. In the
beginning, we focused on pairs of events (see Section III-A),
and finally considered triples of events (see Section III-B).
In addition, we filtered out consequences of (simultaneous)
events at two airports, and analyzed which events resulted in
these problematic consequences (see Section III-C).
A. Pairs of Events
We classified the situations, defined by pairs of events by
two criteria: by the average (mean) controller rating, and by
the maximum controller rating. In both cases we separated the
analysis for the two different workplace designs with switching
of the video panorama between airports (“UJ”) and the set-
up where both airports were visible to the ATCO at all time
(“UN”). 65 different situations described by pairs of events
where identified within the data in the condition “UN”, 55 in
condition “UJ”. A comparison of the two workplace designs is
given. So, the effect of having all relevant information visible
at all time on perceived handling qualities can be estimated.
1) Mean Controller Rating: The rationale behind using the
mean controller rating is that a situation can be manageable or
unmanageable depending on the ATCO’s experience, age, and
various other factors. If we aim to achieve a generic measure,
we can assume an “average controller”. We are particularly
interested in the factors that will be problematic to this average
controller. Hence, we computed the mean over all ATCO
evaluations for the situation as an approximate to this average
controller. The list of all event pairs with their according mean
rating is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for the UJ and UN
setup, respectively. We identify all event pairs with a mean
controller rating of at least 7 (shown as red bars and red pairs
in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively) as critical: the average
controller needs to operate at least with reduced situational
awareness, or even deems the situation impossible to handle.
We identify 18 critical event pairs for the UJ setup and 17 for
the UN setup.
We observe that the lists of critical event pairs differ slightly,
however, pairs with a conflict at a single airport are prevalent
in both lists (highlighted in green in Table II), while, for
example, pairs that contain an emergency are problematic for
the average controller in the UJ setup, but not for the average
controller in the UN setup (highlighted in purple in Table II).
2) Maximum Controller Rating: Using a maximum con-
troller as the representative instead of the average controller
rating could be considered as more conservative: Possibly, only
a single ATCO observer experienced the criticallity associated
with a certain situation as very high (assigns a 7-10 to the
situation), and all other ATCOs deem it solvable. However,
first of all we like to identify all critical factors for the
remote tower environment. Extending the list that we might
have to filter out by actual correlation later on, anyhow is
the approach by which failing to identify an important factor
is less likely. Moreover, if we come back to our long-term
application goal of such a complexity measure: if we want to
Fig. 1. Event pairs for the UJ setup ordered by mean controller rating,
red bars indicate a maximum controller rating of at least 7.
ensure safe operation, we should exclude situations that will
be unmanageable for any ATCO, hence, integrating all these
factors is our aim in the second set of factors.
The list of all event pairs with their according maximum
rating is shown in Figure 3 for the UJ setup and in Figure 4
for the UN setup. Obviously, the number of situations with a
maximum rating of at least 7 is at least as high as the number
of event pairs with a mean controller rating of at least 7. The
ratio of event pairs that are deemed critical to the total number
of event pairs is considerably higher for the UJ setup (38/55)
than for the UN setup (31/65). Also the number of event pairs
that obtain a maximum rating of 10 (that is, are part of an
impossible situation) is with 22 event pairs for the UJ setup
Fig. 2. Boxplot of the controller rating for the event pairs for the UN
setup ordered by mean controller rating, ties are broken by ordering
w.r.t the maximum. The mean is shown in green, the median in red (if
they coincide, only the mean is shown). The colors of the event pairs
show the event pairs for the UN setup ordered by mean controller
rating, red indicates a maximum controller rating of at least 7.
more than four times as large as the 5 event pairs for the UN
setup. Only 9 out of these 22 event pairs are considered critical
at all for the UN setup.
If we consider the event pairs that are rated critical for the
UN, but not for the UJ setup, we observe the following pairs:
Approach and approach, taxi and clearance, go-around and
conflict at a single airport, clearance and go-around, landing
and go-around, taxi and high traffic volume, high traffic
volume and conflict at a single airport, taxi and conflict at
a single airport, departure and technical problem, landing and
TABLE II
EVENT PAIRS THAT WERE CRITICAL FOR THE MEAN CONTROLLER RATING
FOR EITHER THE UN OR THE UJ SETUP. EVENT PAIRS THAT WERE NOT
CRITICAL FOR A SETUP ARE DENOTED BY AN ‘’-”, THE OTHER EVENT
PAIRS ARE SHOWN WITH THEIR MEAN CONTROLLER RATING
Situation UN UJ
Approach/Conflict 9.5 9.0
Clearance/Approach 9.5 7.5
Start/Conflict 9.0 9.0
Start/Approach 9.0 9.0
Landing/Go around 9.0 -
Clearance/Go around 9.0 -
Go around/Conflict 9.0 -
Landing/Conflict 8.33 7.2
Approach/Approach 8.0 -
High traffic/Conflict 8.0 -
Clearance/Conflict 7.57 -
Departure/High traffic 7.5 -
Clearance/Start 7.0 9.67
Departure/Conflict 7.0 9.0
Landing/High traffic 7.0 7.0
Departure/Technical problem 7.0 -
Taxi/Conflict 7.0 -
Start/Emergency - 10.0
Start/Problem - 10.0
Landing/Outbound traffic - 9.0
Departure/Emergency - 8.33
Taxi/Start - 8.0
Release/High traffic - 8.0
Clearance/Departure - 8.0
Taxi/Emergency - 7.5
Start/Start - 7.2
Conflict/Conflict - 7.0
TABLE III
TOTAL NUMBER OF EVENT PAIRS, AND SHARE OF CRITICAL EVENT PAIRS
UN UJ
# identified event pairs 65 55
# event pairs with mean rating≥ 7 17 18
share of event pairs with mean rating ≥ 7 26% 33%
# event pairs with max rating ≥ 7 31 38
share of event pairs with max rating ≥ 7 48% 69%
release, and taxi and release.
The following event pairs are rated as critical for the UJ
setup, but not for the UN setup: problem and emergency,
clearance and problem, taxi and start, clearance and emer-
gency, start and emergency, taxi and departure, landing and
emergency, taxi and taxi, landing and problem, departure and
emergency, departure and start, start and problem, taxi and
emergency, conflict at a single airport and conflict at a single
airport, landing and outbound traffic, landing and approach,
and release and high traffic volume. Again, we can observe
that situations with an emergency at one airport have a higher
problematic significance for the UJ setup.
In general, we can conclude that for the UJ setup a higher
ratio of all event pairs leads to a critical rating, see Table III.
This effect can be explained by the workplace design which
prevented ATCOs to have all relevant information available at
the same time. As this experimental condition was used for
Fig. 3. Event pairs for the UJ setup ordered by max controller rating.
scientific purpose but not for operational use, the following
analysis focusses on the UN setup—the setup that is also
planned for the RTCs in Sweden.
To obtain a better comparison of the controller ratings w.r.t
the mean and the maximum we present a boxplot for the UN
setup in Figure 2.
B. Triples of Events
While the analysis of pairs of events gives us an idea,
which factors decrease handling qualities, they often receive a
higher rating when they are part of a situation with even more
events. Hence, we consider the triples of events for which the
rating dominates at least the rating of one of its sub-pairs. For
example, for a triple of events (A,B,C) we consider the event
Fig. 4. Event pairs for the UN setup ordered by max controller rating.
pairs (A,B), (B,C), and (A,C), and consider it as a complicating
triple if the rating of the triple (A,B,C) dominates at least
one pair, e.g., (A,B)—it could dominate w.r.t. the mean or
maximum rating, that is, (A,B,C) could have a mean rating of
6 and maximum rating of 9, while (A,B) has a mean rating
of 5 and a maximum rating of 10, or a mean rating of 7 and
a maximum rating of 8. The idea is that in this case adding
an event clearly increases the complexity of the situation for
the ATCO (while for a triple that does not dominate any of its
sub-pairs, the intrinsic complexity seems to already stem from
a combination of two factors). Of course, such dominance is
in particular interesting for those triples of events that have
a rating of 7 or higher w.r.t. at least one criterion, which we
consider as critical triples. We consider only the UN setup.
The detailed analysis can be found in Figure 5: We only
show the dominated sub-pairs (because of space restrictions)
and not all sub-pairs of a triple, and highlight the critical
triples in orange. Most of the triples dominate at most one
pair, however, there exist triples that dominate all of their
sub-pairs. In the former case, only adding a third to one
sub-pair increases the complexity rating, e.g., for the triple
clearance/approach/conflict at a single airport, only adding
an approach to the event pair clearance/conflict at a single
airport will increase the complexity, while the event pairs
approach/conflict and approach/clearance at a single airport
already contain so much intrinsic complexity that adding
the event clearance or conflict, respectively, cannot increase
the controller rating. On the other hand, the triple clear-
ance/landing/start dominates all of its sub-pairs w.r.t. the mean
rating, that is, w.r.t. the average controller.
Moreover, we can observe that no critical triple contains
the events emergency, call sign mix-up, communication, and
problem. It is important to notice, that all critical event
triples that dominate w.r.t the mean rating, dominate one sub-
pair clearly, that is, here we suggest that the added event
significantly increases the complexity.
C. Consequences of Eventsand causing factors
Finally, we filtered out consequences of (simultaneous)
events at two airports, and analyzed which events contributed
to these problematic consequences. The coding variables mon-
itoring problem, small delay, mix-up of airports, switching
airports, and communication problem were rated as conse-
quences. Data from both conditions UN and UJ were used
in this analysis. The data set contained 96 situations with
problematic consequences.
The rationale behind this analysis is that problematic con-
sequences like a monitoring problem can be an indicator of
a potentially risky, non-manageable situation, and that events
that often lead to such consequences can also be considered as
critical complexity factors. The results are shown in Figure 6.
Some events often lead to problematic consequences, e.g.,
40% of communication led to a communication problem,
and—most significantly—100% of VFR traffic led to a com-
munication problem. VFR was not one of the predefined
scenario events. That is, we only know that VFR traffic was
present if the ATCO mentioned it. Thus, 100% of mentions of
VFR traffic coincided with a communication problem. On the
other hand, go-arounds, technical problems, general problems,
initial calls, outbound traffic and emergencies never were
causing effect of a situation with a problematic consequence.
D. Summary
Our analysis led to three sets of critical complexity factors:
first, single events that lead to critical handling qualities for
at least one controller, average controller or by at least one
controller—as impossible or manageable only with limited
situational awareness (SectionII-A). One main factor is the
availability of relevant information. Within the switching con-
ditions, emergencies at one airport reduced handling qualities
Situation mean min max Situation mean min max 
Clearance/Start/Callsign 
mixup 
3 3 3 Taxi/Release 5,333333333 3 7 
Start/Callsign mixup 2,5 2 3 Taxi/Landing/High traffic 6,333333333 5 8 
Taxi/Start/Start 3,5 2 5 Taxi/Landing 3,588235294 1 9 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Clearance/Clearance/Landing 6,666666667 3 9 
Taxi/Departure/Landing 3,5 1 6 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Taxi/Departure 3,2 1 6 Clearance/Landing/Landing 6,666666667 3 9 
Landing/Start/Start 3,625 1 9 Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Taxi/Clearance/Clearance 6,666666667 4 10 
Taxi/Landing/Callsign 4 4 4 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Landing/Callsign mixup 3 2 4 Departure/Departure/Conflict 7 7 7 
Taxi/Landing 3,588235294 1 9 Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 
Start/Start/Communicati 4 4 4 Landing/Landing/High traffic 7 5 9 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 
Release/Start/Start 4 4 4 Clearance/Clearance/Start 7 3 9 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Landing/Release/Release 4,25 3 7 Departure/Departure/Technical 7 7 7 
Release/Release 4,166666667 2 7 Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 
Departure/Landing/Land 4,25 1 9 Departure/Landing/Conflict 7 7 7 
Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 Departure/Landing 4,25 1 9 
Departure/Departure/La 4,25 1 9 Clearance/Start/Start 7 3 9 
Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 
Landing/Landing/Release 4,25 3 7 Clearance/Departure/Conflict 7 7 7 
Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 Clearance/Departure 5,333333333 3 7 
Landing/Landing/Emerge 4,5 3 6 Departure/Departure/High traffic 7,5 6 9 
Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 
Departure/Departure/Em 4,5 3 6 Departure/Landing/High traffic 7,5 6 9 
Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 Departure/Landing 4,25 1 9 
Departure/Departure/Pro 4,5 3 6 Landing/High traffic 7 5 9 
Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 Clearance/Clearance/Conflict 7,571428571 3 10 
Departure/Landing/Emer 4,5 3 6 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Departure/Landing 4,25 1 9 Taxi/High traffic/Conflict 8 8 8 
Clearance/Departure/Pro 4,5 3 6 Taxi/High traffic 6,75 5 8 
Clearance/Problem 4 3 6 Taxi/Conflict 7 6 8 
Landing/Landing/Proble 4,5 3 6 Landing/Landing/Conflict 8,333333333 7 9 
Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 
Departure/Landing/Probl 4,5 3 6 Clearance/Landing/Conflict 8,333333333 7 9 
Departure/Landing 4,25 1 9 Clearance/Landing 6,666666667 3 9 
Clearance/Problem/Emer 4,5 3 6 Clearance/Conflict 7,571428571 3 10 
Clearance/Problem 4 3 6 Clearance/Start/Approach 9 9 9 
Clearance/Emergency 4,333333333 3 6 Clearance/Start 7 3 9 
Clearance/Landing/Probl 4,5 3 6 Start/Start/Approach 9 9 9 
Clearance/Problem 4 3 6 Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 
Clearance/Landing/Emer 4,5 3 6 Clearance/Go around/Conflict 9 9 9 
Clearance/Emergency 4,333333333 3 6 Clearance/Conflict 7,571428571 3 10 
Clearance/Departure/Em 4,5 3 6 Start/Start/Conflict 9 9 9 
Clearance/Emergency 4,333333333 3 6 Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 
Clearance/Release/Releas 5 4 6 Clearance/Clearance/Go around 9 9 9 
Release/Release 4,166666667 2 7 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Start/Start/High traffic 5 5 5 Landing/Go around/Conflict 9 9 9 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Landing/Conflict 8,333333333 7 9 
Taxi/Start/High traffic 5 5 5 Clearance/Start/Conflict 9 9 9 
Taxi/Start 3,5 2 5 Clearance/Start 7 3 9 
Landing/Start/High 5 5 5 Clearance/Conflict 7,571428571 3 10 
Landing/Start 3,625 1 9 Clearance/Landing/Start 9 9 9 
Clearance/Departure/Lan 5,333333333 3 7 Landing/Start 3,625 1 9 
Departure/Landing 4,25 1 9 Clearance/Landing 6,666666667 3 9 
Taxi/Release/Release 5,333333333 3 7 Clearance/Start 7 3 9 
Release/Release 4,166666667 2 7 Clearance/Landing/Go around 9 9 9 
Clearance/Departure/Dep 5,333333333 3 7 Clearance/Landing 6,666666667 3 9 
Departure/Departure 3,619047619 1 9 Landing/Landing/Go around 9 9 9 
Clearance/Clearance/Dep 5,333333333 3 7 Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 
Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 Start/Approach/Approach 9 9 9 
Release/Release/Conflict 6 6 6 Approach/Approach 8 6 10 
Release/Release 4,166666667 2 7 Landing/Start/Conflict 9 9 9 
Landing/Landing/Approa 6 6 6 Landing/Start 3,625 1 9 
Landing/Landing 4,090909091 1 9 Landing/Conflict 8,333333333 7 9 
Start/Start/Go around 6 6 6 Clearance/Approach/Approach 9,5 9 10 
Start/Start 3,454545455 1 9 Approach/Approach 8 6 10 
Taxi/Release/Conflict 6 6 6 Approach/Approach/Conflict 9,5 9 10 
Taxi/Release 5,333333333 3 7 Approach/Approach 8 6 10 
Taxi/Departure/High 6 6 6 Clearance/Clearance/Approach 9,5 9 10 
Taxi/Departure 3,2 1 6 Clearance/Clearance 5,181818182 1 10 
Clearance/Release/Confli 6 6 6 Clearance/Approach/Conflict 9,5 9 10 
Clearance/Release 5 4 6 Clearance/Conflict 7,571428571 3 10 
Taxi/Clearance/Release 6 6 6     
Clearance/Release 5 4 6     
 
 Fig. 5. Triples of events (bold) with dominated sub-pairs (italic), critical triples are highlighted in orange.
Fig. 6. Consequences and percentage of an event that lead to that consequence. The color scale indicates how many percent of an event
caused a problematic consequence..
which was not the case in the condition where both airports
were visible to the controller. Furthermore, the ratio of situa-
tions with critical handling qualities was increased. Focussing
on the list of complexity factors in both conditions, complexity
is increased when ATCOs have to solve a traffic conflict at one
airport and manage routine traffic at the second airport. The
second list contains triples of events that dominate at least
one of their sub-pairs and, hence, adding one of the events
clearly increases the complexity of the situation for the ATCO
(Section III.B). The third list contains factors that are likely
to cause problematic consequences. Here, VFR traffic, higher
traffic numbers and approaching traffic should be mentioned.
IV. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We identified a first set of possible complexity factors
for multiple remote control: by analyzing the ATCO rating
of situations in a simulation of an RTC environment, we
identified events that on their own, or in co-occurrence with
one or two other events drove both the ATCO mental workload
and impaired situational awareness. We focused on factors
leading to critical ratings. Of course, the data also contains
various situations that were rated as non-critical, that is, that
received a rating below 7. An interesting future work direction
is the analysis of these non-critical situations to gain insight
into well-manageable events and traffic situations.
Our analysis of the event pairs and triples demonstrates
that there is not a single factor, but the interplay of events
at both airports, that drives the complexity. This result pattern
is known from safety research. The concept of the human per-
formance envelope also addresses this problem [3]. Basically,
not a single factor can explain performance breakdowns or
critical events but the interplay of several, sometimes marginal,
events. This paper is a starting point for further research in the
factors driving mental workload for RTC operations. Hence,
the events identified in this paper should be part of a study
that aims to give a quantitative measure for the workload of
an RTC controller.
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